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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellees Erwin M, Prince and Folkens Brothers Trucking 
("Prince") do not dispute the Statement ol; Jin isdiction of 
Appel I ant Cirant Dav i tison ( "Davidson") . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court's instruction to the jury mat 
a personal injury judgment is mil sub'jei"! tu federal income tax 
constitutes any reversible error. Standard of review: de novo. 
See, Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp,, 7 5 2 P 2d 
884 (Utah 1988) (legal isMim will be reviewed for correctness). 
2. Whether the trial court's refusal to allow Davidson's 
expert to give an opinion on the ultimate issue ol whether m not 
Prince was negligent const" i luted any reversible error. standard 
of review: clearly erroneous. see, State By and Through Utah 
State Dept. of Social Services v. woods , 7 4 2 p , 2 d 118 f lit ah App, 
1987) (decision, whether to admi t expert testimony lies within the 
sound discretion of trial court and ruling will be sustained 
unless clearly erroneous). 
3. Whether the tr i al court's admission of evidence of 
factual statement contained in a demand letter constituted any 
reversible error. Standarc. ui review: clear ] y ei r oneous. See, 
Fisher v. Trapp, 748 P, 2d 204 (Utah App. 1988) (trial court's 
rulings regarding admissibility .: evidence K;;: not be dif 
unless it clearly appears tf -:.:.;;. 
DETERMINATIVE RULES 
Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
No error in either the admission or the exclusion 
of evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or 
order or in anything done or omitted by the court or by 
any of the parties, is grounds for granting a new trial 
or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless 
refusal to take such action appears to the court 
inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at 
every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error 
or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the 
substantial rights of the parties. 
Rule 103 of the Utah Rules of Evidence: 
Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which 
admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right 
of the party is affected. . . . 
Rule 408 of the Utah Rules of Evidence: 
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or 
promising to furnish , or (2) accepting or offering or 
promising to accept, a valuable consideration in 
compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which 
was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not 
admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the 
claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements 
made in compromise negotiations is likewise not 
admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion 
of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because 
it is presented in the course of compromise 
negotiations. This rule also does not require 
exclusion when the evidence is offered for another 
purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a 
witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or 
proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation 
or prosecution. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Although Prince does not dispute Davidsonfs general 
description of the course of the proceedings below, Davidson's 
Statement of Facts is incomplete, and contains a number of 
inaccuracies and irrelevancies. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 
24(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Prince submits 
the following Statement of Facts: 
1. During trial in the court below, Davidson called an 
expert accident reconstructionist to testify concerning certain 
opinions held by the expert. (Partial Trial Transcript ["PTT"] 
at pp. 3-23.) 
2. Pursuant to questions by Davidson's counsel, the expert 
presented his opinion to the jury as to, inter alia: (i) the 
reason Prince's truck overturned while going around a curve; (ii) 
whether the truck was travelling too fast for the curve; (iii) 
what the speed of the truck was as it went through the curve; 
(iv) what the speed limit was at the curve; (v) whether a person 
hauling livestock should be concerned with his load and what the 
concerns should be; and (vi) whether a person hauling livestock 
could foresee the possibility of injury if the truck overturned. 
(PTT at pp. 14-22. ) 
3. After eliciting such opinions, and others, Davidson's 
counsel asked whether the expert was also of the opinion that 
Prince was "negligent in the operation of his motor vehicle at 
the time this accident occurred". When Prince's counsel 
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objected, the court did not allow the expert to testify as to the 
ultimate issue of negligence. (PTT at p. 22.) 
4. One of the theories presented to the jury by Prince's 
counsel was that Davidson was contributorily negligent in causing 
his own injuries because when Davidson saw the steer that had 
been released from Princefs truck laying beside the railroad 
tracks in an area bounded by a right-way fence, Davidson 
approached too closely to the animal, causing the animal to 
choose to get to its feet and chase him. (Supplement Partial 
Trial Transcript ("SPTT") at pp. 50-51.) 
5. During depositions and at trial, Davidson testified to 
a number of different distances from which he first approached 
the steer. Davidson stated variously, for example, that the 
distance was forty feet, thirty feet, twenty-five feet, twenty-
two feet and twenty feet. (PTT at pp. 45-46.) 
6. Davidson had also written a demand letter to Prince's 
insurer stating that the distance from which he had approached 
the steer was actually ten feet. The trial court allowed 
Prince's counsel to refresh Davidson's recollection, or to 
impeach Davidson's credibility, solely with the ten-foot 
statement contained in the letter. (SPTT at pp. 47-48.) 
7. Although the letter speaks for itself and is attached 
in its entirety to Davidson's Brief, the Court should note that 
it contains no concession or offer, nor expresses any willingness 
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whatsoever to compromise Davidsonfs claim. (PTT at pp. 65-
67. ) x 
8. After the parties had rested, the trial court 
instructed the jury as to damages. The court informed the jury 
that its duty was, inter alia, to determine the amount of damages 
it found "from a preponderance of the evidence would fairly and 
adequately compensate the plaintiff for any injury and loss 
plaintiff may have sustained as a result of the accident and any 
injuries complained of by plaintiff." (R. 221.) 
9. The court also instructed the jury it "was not 
permitted to award speculative damages, by which term is meant 
compensation for detriment which, although possible, is remote, 
conjectural or speculative." The court then stated in pertinent 
part as follows: 
In determining the amount of damages you may not 
include in, or add to an otherwise just award, any sum 
for the purpose of punishing the defendants, or to 
serve as an example or warning for others. In 
addition, you may not include in your award any sum for 
court costs or attorneys fees. Neither may any sum of 
money be added to that amount for federal income taxes. 
I charge you as a matter of law that the amount awarded 
by your verdict is exempt from federal income taxation. 
(R. 225, 229.) 
10. After deliberations, the jury awarded Davidson total 
damages in the amount of $45,539.80, and found Davidson forty 
aThis is contrary to Davidson's Statement of Facts, which 
characterizes the letter as a "settlement negotiation letter." 
See, Davidson's Brief, at p. 4. 
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percent (40%) at fault for such damages. The jury found Prince 
sixty percent (60%) at fault. (R. 242-244.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Where the jury in this personal injury action was 
instructed that it was to award damages measured by full and 
adequate compensation for any injuries caused by Prince's 
negligence, and that it was not to speculate, an instruction 
which correctly informed the jury that any judgment awarded was 
not subject to federal income taxes did nothing to impair 
Davidson's substantial rights. 
2. Simply because the rules allow expert testimony on 
ultimate issues under certain circumstances, it does not follow 
that the trial court's decision to exclude such testimony in this 
case was improper where the trial court allowed ample testimony 
from which the jury could infer such negligence. Even if the 
exclusion was improper, it in no way affected Davidson's 
substantial rights where other evidence of negligence was before 
the jury and the jury in fact found Prince negligent. 
3. The trial court's decision to allow Prince's counsel to 
impeach Davidson's credibility with an admission of fact 
contained in a demand letter in no way violates the rule 
prohibiting evidence of compromise because the letter neither 
expressed nor implied a willingness to compromise. Even if it 
had been a letter offering compromise, the evidence was not 
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offered to prove liability or validity of claim or its amount as 
prohibited by the rule. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION ON 
TAX CONSEQUENCES PROVIDES NO BASIS 
FOR OVERTURNING THE JURY'S VERDICT. 
In Utah, a jury's verdict will be overturned only where any 
error committed in instructing the jury was so substantial and 
prejudicial that there is a reasonable likelihood that the result 
would have been different in the absence of such error. See 
e.g., Matter of Estate of Kessler, 702 P.2d 86 (Utah 1985). See 
also, Utah R. Civ. P. 61. Thus the instruction as to the federal 
tax consequences of any judgment does not require reversal unless 
it can be concluded that the jurors have been confused to 
Davidson's prejudice and/or mislead as to the law. See, State v. 
Ouzouian, 491 P.2d 1093, 1095-96 (Utah 1971) (no basis to support 
contention that instruction to which appellants excepted affected 
substantial rights so as to require reversal). 
Courts addressing the question of whether a jury's verdict 
in a personal injury case must be reversed if the jury is 
instructed that its damage award is not subject to federal income 
taxes have held that while it would not be error for the trial 
judge to refuse to give such an instruction, such an instruction 
would nevertheless not justify reversal if given. For example, 
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in Bach v. Penn Central Transportation Co., 502 F.2d 117 (6th 
Cir. 1974), the court stated: 
Notwithstanding our previous holdings that the refusal 
to give such a charge is not error, we are persuaded 
that neither is it reversible error in a personal 
injury actions involving awards exempt from federal 
taxation for the trial judge in the sound exercise of 
his discretion to advise the jury affirmatively that 
its award will not be liable to federal income tax. 
502 F.2d at 1123. See also, Wickizer v. Medley, 348 N.E.2d 96 
(Ind. App. 1976); and Nichols v. Marshall, 486 F.2d 791 (10th 
Cir. 1973). This rule is justified primarily because in a 
personal injury case like this one, the instruction does not 
require the jury to make complicated calculations, nor does it 
necessitate speculation. It merely gives the jurors an accurate 
statement of the tax law. Id. 
The cases Davidson cites in his brief are not to the 
contrary, but simply state the general rule that it is not error 
to refuse to give such an instruction. See, Davidson's Brief, at 
pp. 4-8. With one exception the cases Davidson cites simply do 
not reach the issue presented here, whether, once an instruction 
is given, it is so prejudicial as to require overturning the 
jury's verdict. C£., Barnett v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349 (Wyo. 1981) 
(instruction not given, no error in refusing); Paducah Area 
Public Library v. Terrick, 655 S.W.2d 19 (Ky. App. 1983) 
(instruction not given, no error in refusing); Vehn v. Prouty, 
321 N.W.2d 534, 538-39 (S.D. 1982) (instruction not given, no 
error in refusing); Hansen v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 734 
F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1984) (instruction not given, no error in 
refusing); Kirk v. Ford Motor Co., 383 N.W.2d 193 (Mich. App. 
1985) (instruction not given, no error in refusing); Ravera v. 
Philadelphia Theological Seminary, 474 A.2d 605 (Pa. Super. 1984) 
(instruction not given, no error in refusing); Anderson v. 
Teamsters Local 116 BLDG. Club, 347 N.W.2d 309 (N.D. 1984) 
(instruction not given, no error in refusing); Hall v. County of 
New Madrid, 645 S.W.2d 149 (Mo. App. 1982) (instruction not 
given, no error refusing); Young v. Environmental Air Products, 
Inc., 665 P.2d 88 (Ariz. App. 1982) (instruction not given, no 
error refusing).2 
In the instant case, the jury was instructed that if 
Davidson was entitled to recover it should award damages that 
would "fairly and adequately compensate the plaintiff for any 
injury and loss plaintiff may have sustained as a result of the 
accident and injuries complained of by plaintiff." The jury was 
instructed that it was not permitted to award "speculative 
damages, by which term is meant compensation for detriment which, 
although possible, [was] remote, conjectural or speculative." 
Davidson does not contend that he was entitled to additional 
2The only case Davidson cites which addresses the issue of 
whether an income tax instruction is so prejudicial as to require 
reversal is Scallon v. Hooper, 293 S.E.2d 843, 845 (N.C. App. 
1982). Scallon, however, was not a personal injury action like 
this case, but was a wrongful death action, and the court 
specifically limited its holding to actions for wrongful death: 
"[The tax instruction] would unduly complicate a wrongful death 
action, which is already complicated by our statute . . . ." 
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damages based upon any mistaken belief that a portion of the 
verdict would be used to pay taxes. 
Thus the charge correctly reflected that Davidson was 
entitled to recover fair compensation for any injuries and losses 
caused by Prince's negligence. The instructions given, read 
together, merely served to caution the jury to base its award on 
the evidence, not on speculation as to tax consequence, and it 
nowhere appears how the instructions given in this case adversely 
affected Davidson's substantial rights. Under the circumstances, 
any error in giving the instruction that a damage award was not 
subject to federal income taxes did not nothing to require 
reversal of the jury's verdict. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR 
IN EXERCISING ITS DISCRETION TO 
EXCLUDE DAVIDSON'S EXPERT OPINION 
ONLY AS TO THE ULTIMATE ISSUE OF 
DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE. 
Davidson correctly points out that the rules allow expert 
testimony in the form of an opinion that embraces an ultimate 
issue. See, Appellees' Brief, pp. 8-9. Davidson is mistaken, 
however, in assuming that simply because such testimony is 
possible, the trial court committed any error in not allowing 
such testimony in the instant case. 
This is so primarily because the trial court did allow 
Davidson's expert to give his opinion as to, inter alia: (i) the 
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reason Prince's truck overturned while going around a curve; (ii) 
whether the truck was travelling too fast for the curve; (iii) 
what the speed of the truck was as it went through the curve; 
(iv) what the speed limit was at the curve; (v) whether a person 
hauling livestock should be concerned with his load and what the 
concerns should be; and (vi) whether a person hauling livestock 
could foresee the possibility of injury if the truck overturned. 
Contrary to the conclusory statement in Davidson's brief, none of 
these opinions were expressed to the jury in wholly technical 
terms or were impossible or even difficult for a lay jury to 
understand. 
Under such circumstances, the expert's opinion on the 
ultimate issue of defendants' negligence was merely cumulative, 
and may easily have been so cumulative as to be more prejudicial 
than probative. The trial court correctly exercised its 
discretion in disallowing the opinion because such testimony was 
unnecessary. 
Just as importantly, even if it were error not to allow the 
opinion in the conclusory terms sought by Davidson's counsel, it 
nowhere appears how Davidson was harmed by the error. "Error may 
not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence 
unless a substantial right of the party is affected. . . . " 
Utah R. Evid. 103. Where there was substantial other evidence 
presented by the expert from which the jury could infer that 
Prince was negligent, and where the jury in fact did find Prince 
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negligent, there is no basis to overturn the juryfs verdict 
simply because the expert could also have opined as to an 
ultimate issue. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ADMITTED NO 
EVIDENCE OF STATEMENTS MADE IN 
COMPROMISE NEGOTIATIONS, AND EVEN 
IF IT HAD, SUCH STATEMENTS WERE 
EXPRESSLY ADMISSIBLE FOR PURPOSES 
RELATING TO CREDIBILITY. 
As Davidson points out, rule 408 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence excludes evidence of "(1) furnishing or offering or 
promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or promising 
to accept" a "valuable consideration" in compromising or 
attempting to compromise a disputed claim, and evidence of 
statements made in such "compromise" negotiations, if the 
evidence is offered to prove liability or invalidity of the claim 
or its amount. See, Utah R. Evid. 408. The policy underlying 
the rule is grounded in the recognition that willingness to 
compromise a claim for less than all that is due might be 
construed as an admission of weakness, and settlement overtures 
might be adversely affected if compromise efforts that failed 
were subsequently admissible at any trial. See, J. Moore, 
Moore!s Federal Practice § 408.02 (1989 and Supp. 1990).3 
3The text of Utah R. Evid. 408 follows the federal rule, 
verbatim. Thus in the absence of Utah case law counsel has cited 
authorities interpreting the identical federal rule. 
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This Court should note, however, that the language of the 
rule is specific and expressly defines the limits of the 
exclusion. In order for the exclusionary rule to apply, the 
party seeking to have evidence excluded must show that the 
discussion or statements in question were made in "compromise" 
negotiations. :id. at § 408.03. An offer or willingness to 
compromise, which in turn could be construed as an admission, is 
the sine qua non of any communication protected both by the rule 
and the policy underlying the rule. Id. 
The letter at issue in the instant case, however, makes no 
offer and exhibits no willingness whatsoever to compromise 
Davidson1s claim, either for "valuable consideration" or 
otherwise. It simply demands payment in full of Davidson's claim 
and its whole tenor is that Davidson will not compromise one 
iota. Thus the letter and the statements contained therein are 
not inadmissible under rule 408, nor would admission of such 
statements have any chilling effect on "compromise" negotiations. 
See e.g., Gallagher v. Vikings Supply Corp., 411 P.2d 814 (Ariz. 
App. 1966) ("We agree that a statement which is in the nature of 
a settlement proposal or offer should be excluded. However, a 
letter which demands an amount for an alleged claim cannot be 
excluded under this theory. . . . [The letter] in no wise 
purports to concede a fact solely for purposes of settlement. 
Its tenor is unequivocal and precise."). See also, Factor v. 
C.I.R., 281 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1960) ("Despite the use of the 
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term fsettlement meetings1 by counsel in the case, there is 
nothing in the record to indicate that, at any time during these 
conferences, the taxpayer made an offer to pay any amount, 
conditioned upon a denial of liability, which is essential to a 
true offer of compromise. Nor does the record of the 
conferences, as testified to in court, disclose any 'compromise1 
items considered by the taxpayer.ff) . 
Perhaps more importantly, even if the letter did contain 
some offer to compromise, which it does not, Prince's counsel did 
not offer the ten-foot statement "to establish liability or 
invalidity of a claim or its amount" as prohibited by rule 408. 
In United States Aviation Underwriters, inc. v. Olympia Wings, 
Inc., 896 F.2d 949 (5th Cir. 1990), the court held that the trial 
court properly acted within in its discretion under rule 408 when 
it admitted evidence of a settlement that was offered to impeach 
the plaintiff's earlier deposition testimony. The court stated 
as follows: 
We are persuaded that the district court did not abuse 
its discretion in admitting evidence of settlement to 
show the change in [plaintiff's] position since his 
deposition was taken. Fed. R. Evid. 408 permits 
settlement evidence for any purpose except to prove or 
disprove liability or the amount of claim. The 
district court has broad discretion in determining 
whether to admit evidence of settlement for another 
purpose and we will not disturb that decision lightly. 
896 F.2d at 956. 
The Utah Supreme Court has indicated, .in dicta, that this 
same exception obtains under rule 408 of the Utah Rules of 
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Evidence. In Slusher v. Ospital, 777 P.2d 437 (Utah 1989) the 
court stated as follows: 
Taken together, the two statutes [superseded 
sections 78-27-29, -30, Utah Code Ann.] resulted in a 
rule not unlike Utah Rule of Evidence 408, now in 
effect. In other words, they precluded introduction of 
the settlement for purpose of establishing liability, 
but not for purposes relating to credibility. 
777 P.2d at 443. See also, Id. at n. 12 ("If, as therefore 
appears likely, Rule 408 applied to the trial in this case, it 
even more clearly supports the conclusion we reach [that 
"settlement and payment might nonetheless come in other than as 
evidence, such as for impeachment purposes"]."). 
In this case, Davidson had testified as to a number of 
different relevant distances. Prince's counsel offered the ten-
foot statement contained in the demand letter to refresh 
Davidson's recollection as to the actual distance, and/or to 
impeach Davidson's testimony on that point. The trial court 
allowed the ten-foot statement into evidence solely for that 
purpose. Under the circumstances, and according to the 
principles cited above, the evidence was in no way barred by rule 
408. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Prince respectfully submits 
that the trial court committed no errors which would require this 
Court to overturn the jury's verdict and remand for a new trial. 
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Thus the jury's verdict should be upheld and Davidson's appeal 
denied. 
DATED this 16th day of January, 1991. 
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H. James Clegg 
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